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Life has been problematized anew by recent social change and scientific innovation. There are important and
little studied geographical dimensions to any such understanding of “the politics of life itself,” however. A
geographical perspective involves, first, highlighting the spatial aspects of both states and capital, two rather
neglected dimensions of vital politics. Elaborating the geographical constitution of vital politics entails further
describing the related powers of knowledges and practices. Reflecting on the geographical dimensions of longevity
andhealth leads directly to a recognition of the ethical implications of the geographical luck of birth and residence.
Taking up this ethical challenge requires specifying at least six components of geographical justice: culpability,
fairness, care, state failure, human rights, and solidarity with environmental and social justice. Key Words:
biomedicine, care, health, inequality, justice, longevity, medical ethics.
Otra vez, la vida adquiere dimensio´n proble´mica en virtud del cambio social y la innovacio´n cientı´fica. Sin
embargo, aunque existen importantes dimensiones geogra´ficas para comprender “las polı´ticas de la vida misma,”
muy escaso es el estudio hecho sobre el particular. Una perspectiva geogra´fica a este respecto implica, primero que
todo, destacar los aspectos espaciales tanto de los estados como de sus capitales, dos expresiones de las polı´ticas
vitales hasta ahora muy marginadas. Elaborar la constitucio´n geogra´fica de la polı´tica vital demanda describir con
mayor profundidad los poderes relacionados de conocimientos y pra´cticas. El reflexionar sobre las dimensiones
geogra´ficas de longevidad y salud lleva directamente a un reconocimiento de las implicaciones e´ticas de la
casualidad geogra´fica del lugar de nacimiento y residencia. Para asumir estos retos e´ticos se requiere especificar
por lo menos seis componentes de justicia geogra´fica: culpabilidad, equidad, cuidado, falla del estado, derechos
humanos y solidaridad con la justicia ambiental y social. Palabras clave: biomedicina, cuidado, salud, desigualdad,
justicia, longevidad, e´tica me´dica.
Life is being politicized in new and novel waystoday, especially in Western societies and espe-cially with regard to some of the possibilities
wrought by recent and rapid developments in the bi-
ological sciences. A growing number of geographers,
anthropologists, and sociologists are exploring such “vi-
tal” issues as the social implications of neuroscience
or the political and legal vortex surrounding regener-
ative medicine (Fischer 2003; N. Brown and Webster
2004;Wainwright et al. 2006). So, too, are they analyz-
ing how life is being revalued (Collier and Ong 2005;
Sunder Rajan 2006; Waldby and Mitchell 2007). Such
nonphilosophical accounts of the politics of life (that
is, accounts that are based primarily on ethnographic or
sociological investigation rather than on a purely philo-
sophical reflection) concern what we might call the
form of life itself and how various technologies recon-
figure it. Suchwork constitutes a sociology of possibility.
The emphasis of a sociology of possibility on ad-
vanced biomedical technologies, although it might of-
fer a readily available means for theoretical reflection
on the nature of being human, does not provide either a
particularly representative account of the politicization
of human life today (except for a minority elite within
theWest) nor does it broach what are arguably themost
politically and ethically pressing questions concerning
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the politics of life for the majority of the world’s popula-
tion. Possibilities are not everywhere and for all people
the same, of course. There are also some basic geograph-
ical questions one might ask about the way “life itself”
is politicized today.
These questions turn less on the possibilities opened
up by new technologies and more on the problems of
their uneven distribution, because, clearly, rather less
novel and more mundane material inequalities exist
alongside (and in some cases they are being reshaped by)
the technological developments that preoccupy much
of the recent literature on the politics of human life. In
this article we therefore want to sketch out an analysis
of the politics of life that starts with the most basic
problems of inequality in life chances and the broader
structural conditions in which life chances are shaped
(Benatar, Daar, and Singer 2003).
Our argument develops over five parts. First, we offer
a critique of some of the recent work on vital politics,
asserting in particular the need to pay greater attention
to states and capital when thinking about vital poli-
tics. We then suggest ways in which thinking about the
geographical constitution of vital knowledge and vital
practices helps to reincorporate these elements and bet-
ter frames our present capacity not only to make live
but also to let die. In the third part, we examine in more
detail what we consider to be the most pressing feature
of these geographical dimensions of vitality, the geog-
raphy of longevity (or “geographical luck”). We further
correlate this notion of geographical luck with an anal-
ysis of geographical justice, then conclude by noting six
basic vital geographies: culpability, fairness, the ethics
of care, state failure, human rights, and the global social
and environmental justice movement.
Vital Politics
Human life has its limits in birth and death. To live
is to be able to make things happen by free will; things
that would not occur without our having desired them,
would not occur purely by what Kant termed “mecha-
nism” (Kant [1790] 1911, 7).Wemight follow P. Patton
(1989) and Diprose (1995) in appropriating Berlin’s
(1958) concept of “positive freedom” to describe this
dimension of our being-in-the-world, but Berlin’s de-
piction of life as capacity is limited. Life should also be
thought of as potential. It can be developed, realized,
squandered, used up, or lost. Vital geographiesmight ex-
plore this twofold sense of life, as limit and as capacity.
In both respects, life is subject to cultural, political, eco-
nomic, and technological imperatives that vary greatly
between places and that mean that the question, “What
is life?” must ever have a series of geographical answers.
This question is raised in a very direct way by recent
work on biosociality (Rabinow 1992), the genetic imag-
inary (Franklin 2000), and vital politics (Rose 2006).
There is much to learn from this literature, but we begin
by considering some of the ways that the focus on novel
science alone might in fact constrain unduly work on
the geography of “life itself.”
In The Politics of Life Itself, Rose describes what he
means by a “vital politics.” Set against earlier systems for
the management of life, “the vital politics of our own
century looks rather different,” because, argues Rose,
“[i]t is neither delimited by the poles of illness and
health, nor focused on eliminating pathology to pro-
tect the destiny of the nation. Rather, it is concerned
with our growing capacities to control, manage, engi-
neer, reshape, and modulate the very vital capacities of
human beings as living creatures” (Rose 2006, 3). Rose
proposes that recent developments in the biological sci-
ences mean that “life itself” is currently being refigured
not at the organic but at the molecular level. The tech-
nological capacities of genetic engineering open up for
some people the possibility of optimizing their period
of healthy life: a “prospect” that might, in turn, im-
pose on them an obligation to avail themselves of this
monitoring. The ethical significance of the creation
and disposition of vitality, he proposes, will increas-
ingly draw citizens into engagement with professional
bioethicists. In place of biopolitics, Rose posits an emer-
gent era of “ethopolitics” in which responsibility for the
management, shaping, and conduct of vital capacities
are, like many other things, being devolved from the
state into the private realm of citizens’ own desires and
responsibilities.
There is much to admire in this account of a new vi-
tal politics, but we would point to the additional value
in thinking of life as limit and capacity on the basis of
three basic points. First, and as Rose would likely be the
first to acknowledge, the account of the politics of life
itself that we have to date is one centered largely on the
advanced liberal democracies. A more geographically
inclusive account, however, would help to unsettle cer-
tain of the Western norms that have become the focus
of much debate in this literature. Braun (2007) has re-
cently argued, for example, that many of the medical
technologies that Rose discusses are beyond the finan-
cial reach of the vast majority of people living. This
is not to say we should not document the inevitable
geographies of technological transfer and adaptation of
these technologies (Reid-Henry forthcoming) but it is
to acknowledge that vital politics take various forms
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that might often be quite removed from considerations
of technology. As Daniels (1985, x) has argued, from a
philosophical perspective, although “themore dramatic
topics of abortion, euthanasia, and organ transplanta-
tion [seem] to hog the philosophical stage,” these might
not feature as prominently if the focus were instead on
designing a just health care system. Benatar (2003, 389)
notes a related individualism in medical ethics: “[t]he
understandable focus on ethical issues at the interper-
sonal level has undoubtedly eclipsed ethical issues that
need to be addressed in dealing with [broader] public
health issues.”
A related point concerns how one approaches tech-
nology. Given that the stated interest of much recent
work on vital politics is to consider how definitions and
treatments of life are changing, it makes sense to focus
on new technological (invariably biomedical) develop-
ments, where such definitions might indeed be being
actively reworked. Any work seeking to understand so-
ciety through the lens of biomedicine, however, priv-
ileges shifts in the concepts of life and practices made
with regard to life in the domain of possibility. There
is a danger that such an approach might ignore the
politics of life in more mundane settings. Rose argues,
for example, that in the past eugenics was about try-
ing to control the reproduction of undesirables so that
the next generation would come from the fittest mem-
bers of the current generation. Now, he suggests, the
new technologies of reproduction give to couples, and
not the state, the decision about whether, given vari-
ous probabilities of particular biological outcomes, they
wish to proceed and give life to a fetus. This is an ex-
tremely interesting development, but it seems wrong to
suggest that such novel and privatized determinations of
life are anything like as ubiquitous as the regulations of
life’s limits and capacities wrought by states and capital.
This gives rise to the third point on which we di-
verge from Rose’s account. In place of an emphasis on
emergent and technologically derived choices (and
their attendant responsibilities), we would emphasize
the relationship between individual autonomy and
political-economic structures. Consideration of the role
of states and capital is crucial here, for both also work
to (re)constitute vital limits and capacities. States have
long licensed the use of human capacity through var-
ious employment laws, and capital has long been the
arbiter of human vulnerability in terms of class, eth-
nicity, gender, and location (Rapp 1999; Farmer 2004).
To reduce biological risk, as Rose does, to nothing more
than the likelihood of disability or illness as it confronts
the individual is to underestimate greatly how human
biophysical existence is directly politicized by states and
capital (Petryna, Lakoff, and Kleinman 2006). From the
geography of capital punishment, to themanagement of
world hunger, to the denial of medical supplies to coun-
tries blockaded for ideological reasons, vital geographies
should beginwith questions of states and capital because
these structure the life chances that confront different
individuals. As a way of framing how it might do so, we
first consider some aspects of the relationship between
these sorts of geographies and human vitality.
Geographies of Life
Human vitality is structured by geographically me-
diated inequalities: patterns of life chances that, al-
though they might be locally articulated, are connected
to events elsewhere. At its crudest, this means that the
value of life in some places is predicated on the non-
value of life elsewhere. Most usually, of course, such a
geography is multifaceted and complex, but it is worth
signaling three persistent and interconnected dynamics
that in various ways might be said to frame the sort of
vital politics Rose and others are concerned with but
also provide a platform for developing a rather differ-
ent critical account thereof. First, we briefly consider
how the production of knowledge about life is bound
upwith the production of geographical knowledgemore
broadly; second, we examine how attempts to mobilize
or deploy this knowledge, or to give social meaning
and value to it, are taken up in existing struggles over
space; third, we sketch out some of the ways in which
these emergent vital orders are themselves creating new
geographical conditions for life itself.
Vital Discourses
The life sciences allow us to conceive of life in certain
ways. They do indeed constitute a foundational epis-
temology of modern life, evident in the “avalanche of
printed numbers” (Hacking 1982) corralled in the name
of civilizing public health in the nineteenth century
(Craddock 2000) and one still apparent today. Speak-
ing of genomics, Sunder Rajan (2006, 14) suggests that
“the sorts of knowledge genomics provides allows us to
grammatically conceive of life in certain ways, not in
terms of Aristotelian poesis, but rather as that whose fu-
tures we can calculate in terms of probabilities of certain
disease events happening.” This is true for some people,
but why it is not true for others is a question less often
asked in the posthumanist literature on the social im-
plications of the contemporary life sciences. Geography
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is part of the answer and particularly in a recognition
that these knowledges—specifically the ability to know
disease events as calculable risks—are produced and
circulate within circumscribed spaces (see, for example,
Hall 2004).
How we know the world is constitutive of how we
come to know ourselves as biophysical beings. The his-
tory of Western knowledge of the self is in part the
history of knowledge of the body, of course, but the
body in question has always been understood through a
distinctively geographical lens and in someways contin-
ues to be so (for an interesting account of howWestern
and non-Western conceptions of bodies and medicine
can coexist, see Del Casino 2004). From Plato’s at-
tempt to connect the care of the body to the care of
the soul in his Timaeus (Phillips 1987; Rabinow 1999)
to the rites of passage that marked social death for un-
desirables (such as lepers) in the Middle Ages (Brody
1974), to know the body was to treat the body in ac-
cordance with broader cosmologies or worldviews (for
a modern example, see Renzaho 2004). The same ap-
plies throughout modern history (Martin 1992). Impe-
rial worldviews were inscribed on the bodies of slaves
(Quinlan 1996), and the mad were confined to ensure
dominant perceptions of social life as sane and ratio-
nal accorded with the world they sought to describe
(Philo 2004). Discourses of life, then, are produced lo-
cally but in concert with broader imaginations of the
world. Modern medicine was stimulated by the chal-
lenges of urban growth (Hardy 1993) and animal hus-
bandry (L. Wilkinson 1992; Swabe 1999) as they either
presented ecological niches for disease or introduced
new pathogens into a suitable pool of hosts.
Contemporary biomedicine is likewise locatable
within this historical and geographical matrix. One of
contemporary biomedicine’s defining features is that it
is produced within increasingly sanctioned institutions
(the hospital, the laboratory, and so on) at the same
time as it continues to seek a universal ambit: It tends
to present as universal a conception of the body that
is in fact a product of its own (in part spatial) opera-
tions. This ascription of universality resists the valid-
ity, even existence, of alternative framings of bodies
and capacities, as in rival cosmologies.1 When we take
biomedicine as our principal referent for contemporary
vital politics, we thus in part occlude the historical at-
tempt to universalize and privilege a particular sort of
body-knowledge and the power relations that pertain to
it (Scheper-Hughes and Lock 1987). Instead, it should
be possible to consider biomedicine in the context of
the imperial (Bell, Brown, and Faire 2006) and other
histories that have helped it to appropriate a universal
referent through which it has marginalized other bodies
and knowledges and against which it has been formed
(Arnold 1994; Anderson 2004) and to consider this
attempt itself in comparative perspective (Lock 2002;
Lakoff 2005).
Just as our knowledge of the world has shaped
biomedical knowledge, we must also remember that
medicine’s own worldview has helped to construct the
world in that image. Whether it be city planners draw-
ing on models of circulation (Sennett 1996) or com-
puter malfunctions that are today described and treated
as “viruses,” our knowledge of bodies and their bio-
logical processes has a pervasive influence on the way
we organize our world (Martin 1987; Treichler 1999;
Thacker 2003). Canguilhem ([1966] 1991) writes of the
historical formation of concepts of normal and patho-
logical in modern medicine (Philo 2007), but we might
also take from his analysis that it is in these crossings be-
tween medical knowledge of the body and geographical
knowledge of societies that many such political deter-
minations arise. This much was evident in the national
stereotyping of syphilis (as the Spanish disease for the
Dutch, the “French Pox” for the English, and so on;
Porter 1997, 166), and it is evident today. King (2002),
for example, compares the emerging diseases worldview
with colonial-era ideologies of public health to show
how on the basis of particular geographical imagina-
tions the latest understandings of health could be mo-
bilized to serve much wider political-economic agendas
(Ingram 2007). Perhaps the most significant contem-
porary manifestation of this discourse, though, is that
of biosecurity. Braun (2007) proposes that we consider
the current mantra of biosecurity as itself related to
the emergence of a geopolitics of interventionism and
extraterritoriality. Discourses of biosecurity echo an im-
perial geopolitics that justifies defending the homeland
by preemptively intervening in foreign countries. For
example, in the name of security, rich states anticipate
controlling their own exposure to a humanized version
of bird flu by public health interventions in Vietnamese
villages.
This is a pertinent point and we raise a not dissimilar
one later. For now, though, we simply want to suggest
that arguments that point to the radical openness of
new technologies can be readily coopted by politics that
seek to use technologically mediated threats to justify
the expansion of sovereign powers abroad. In the case
of bird flu, attentionmight thus be better focused on the
political ecologies of human–bird relations, such as are
described in Davis’s (2005) account. His story is every
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [M
ay
no
oth
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
8:3
6 2
2 A
ug
us
t 2
01
7 
558 Kearns and Reid-Henry
bit as apocalyptic as many biosecurity discourses but the
practices he implicates are those of commercialized agri-
culture rather than the production of novel life forms.
Focusing not on the radical openness of possibilities but
on the often quite structurally closed probabilities of a
global ethics tied to the capitalist imperative, would
draw our attention here, as it draws the attention of
Davis, to the explosion of meat consumption (partic-
ularly poultry) in the slum cities of the world, which
has produced a new ecology of human–animal prox-
imity. The use of antibiotics as prophylaxis to maintain
chicken weight has produced a dangerous soup in which
viruses will mutate and jump species. The unregulated
movement of live birdswithin the corporate agricultural
sector links third-world cities to factory farms in richer
countries, where the promiscuous use of antibiotics is
extreme and dangerous. The risks are evident and hu-
man influenza has probably always been generated in
such “agricultural” settings. The focus of our attention
should thus be on the care of the birds, rather than on
novel science. Bird care is the heart of the problem, and
in bio-care, rather than biosecurity, lies the solution.
Finally, it is useful to consider how discourses of life
and geographical discourses are, in certain important
regards, mutually constitutive. One cannot account for
the peculiar power of biomedical knowledge without
accounting for the ways that it has also worked to erase
certain geographical differences. Medical research that
accepts race as a reporting category, for example, can
imply that the differences between races have to do
with biological inheritance and are not, say, a conse-
quence of geographical origins or patterns of endogamy
(Epstein 2004). Lifestyle factors that depend in part on
poverty could well influence health, but social groups
have to submit to a form of ethnic medicalization to get
attention from medical research sponsored by the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Drug testing in
the United States tended to use all-male cohorts of col-
lege students to test the efficacy and safety of drugs, but
then approve those drugs for use in all populations. To
get women added to drug testing programs in 1993, the
argument usedwas thatwomen are biologically different
from men (Epstein 2003). In figuring such differences
between men and women as biological, however, such
arguments address, as Epstein (2003) points out, nei-
ther nonbiological causes of ill health (violence, stress,
poverty) nor the nonmedical dimensions of the failure
of health care for women (the sexism, patriarchy, and
ignorance of somemedical professionals). Pertinent dif-
ferences are too often understood as rooted in biology
and not in social or geographical context.
Vital Orders
It also warrants considering how attempts to mo-
bilize or deploy vital knowledge or to give social
meaning and value to it are taken up in broader
attempts at spatial control or ordering according to
particular logics (T. Brown 2000). We need to un-
derstand this point if we figure on developing ac-
counts of how and why human vitality is politicized
in ways that might be connected but not limited to
the technological. Again, there seem to be two coun-
tervailing tendencies here. On the one hand, the de-
ployment of vital knowledge (whether in the form
of long available basic health statistics or new ge-
netic testing kits) gives expression also to the rational-
ities by which such knowledge was produced (Lakoff
2005; Hacking 2006). If life was once “inserted into
history,” as Foucault famously declared, we might now
say that the constant reinvention of ways in which that
insertion can take place has now itself become a specific
logic of power (Clarke et al. 2003). The “interpretive
gaze” of bioethicists and statistical experts, for example,
is organized according to particular prior worldviews
and in turn the vital information they accrue is de-
ployed within already existing social domains (Benatar
2005). Innovation at one end of the spectrum can thus
be devastation at the other, with priority setting, the in-
troduction of new “standards,” and the like demanding
more in theory than can always be delivered in practice
and often drawing both attention and resources away
from the major issue.
Consider, for example, the take-up of the disabil-
ity adjusted life year (DALY) by the World Bank. The
DALY is a measure that considers potential years of
life lost due to premature death alongside equivalent
years of “healthy” life lost by virtue of being in states
of poor health or disability (Murray and Lopez 1996).
The DALY measure is one of the few explicit attempts
to put a quantifiable value not only on living and dy-
ing (as mortality and morbidity statistics seek to do)
but also to place value on life that is lived with disease
(Bond 1999). According to the World Health Organi-
zation (WHO 2007), “[o]ne DALY can be thought of as
one lost year of ‘healthy’ life and the burden of disease
as a measurement of the gap between current health
status and an ideal situation where everyone lives into
old age free of disease and disability.” The underlying
assumptions of the DALY, however—a measure intro-
duced by Western statisticians or biometricians—are
that the burden of disease is felt equally in all countries.
If we think of a condition such as paraplegia, however,
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it soon becomes clear that such a condition is more
“severe” (even for what clinically is an equally severe
condition) in a poor country context in which scant
resources will, and social values might, add to the more
narrowly “biological” disabilities of the condition. As
Allotey et al. (2003, 949) say, DALYs thus “risk exac-
erbating inequalities by undervaluing the burden of dis-
ease in less-developed countries.” They also contribute
to an individualization of health that has nothing to
do with “choice” (as Rose argues) and everything to
do with the upscaling of Western values and in partic-
ular a concern with whether health interventions are
cost-effective, rather than with their equitability. The
DALY was a principal measure informing the WHO’s
Global Burden of Disease Surveys, which are intended
to inform macroscale health decision making over the
next few decades (J. Cohen 2000; Arnesen and Kapiriri
2004).
Such vital orders are not just created in and of them-
selves. They must also be operationalized, which also
involves particular sorts of spatial ordering and control.
It has long been recognized that the reorganization of
space at various levels (international, national, and ur-
ban) constructs niches of biological vulnerability. The
current crisis in Darfur bears witness to this relationship
between dislocation and disease vulnerability. So, too,
does the confinement of individuals in place also shape
their social position and vulnerability, not only to dis-
ease but to the interventions of biomedicine itself. Thus,
infamously, in Tuskegee, Alabama, African-American
subjects were recruited, from 1932, to a study of un-
treated syphilis that continued until 1972, a quarter-
century after their condition might have been treated
with penicillin (J. H. Jones 1981). More benignly, from
1998 to 2004, in collaboration with a private company,
the government of Iceland worked to assemble a ge-
netic database intended to comprehend its entire popu-
lation (Greenhough 2006; Pa´lsson 2007). Certainly the
social marginality and geographical separation of the
poor folk of Tuskegee both allowed and hid their abuse
(Gamble 1997), and the geographical separateness of
Iceland raised the prospects of a fully realized genomic
form of governance (Greely 2000). People who can
be isolated are attractive for biomedical research. Pris-
oner populations, for example, have long represented
an attractive research population for the way that they
are available and located within a relatively stable en-
vironment and have historically been used by both
government and private organizations (Mitford 1973).
Although international and national protections for
human research participants now exist (the 1964Decla-
ration of Helsinki and its subsequent revisions, and the
U.S. Belmont Commission of 1976 that was prompted
by the Tuskegee study, for example), institutional re-
view boards (IRBs)must still nonetheless determine the
extent to which a prison population involved in a trial
might be subject to either explicit or implicit coercion
(such as the possibility for greater social contact by tak-
ing part in a trial; National Institutes of Health 1993;
Harkness 1996; Wohl 1999).
Finally, it therefore also seems important to consider
how individuals are rendered either visible or invisible
to the system as their visibility clearly shapes how they
are positioned relative to vital knowledge. At a very
local level in the United States, for example, in 2004
homeless people accounted for 13 percent of all sub-
stance abuse admissions (more than 175,000) recorded
in the Treatment Episode Data Set (Substance Abuse
and Mental Health Services Administration 2006). Of
these, as many as 25 percent would have suffered from
severe mental illness. Because most homeless people
are only likely to access medical care through emer-
gency services, however, they are effectively screened
out from the sort of health care they need. The homeless
are particularly vulnerable to such co-occurring disor-
ders (a mental health problem combined with a sub-
stance abuse problem) and the difficulties in treating
them are compounded by difficulties in physically ac-
cessing the homeless (Burrows, Pleace, and Quilgars
1997;North et al. 2004). This is a regional variant of the
sort of therapeutic citizenship that Nguyen (2005) has
spoken eloquently of at the global level (see, for exam-
ple, Wilson 2003; Watson et al. 2007; MacKlan 2008).
In both cases, however, there is a need to ask what the
consequences are of the political regulation and reor-
ganization of space through emergent neoliberal doc-
trines. In other words, health outcomes are affected as
much by the political-economic spatial differentiation
of individuals as by the technological mediation of bod-
ies. The two need to be considered together.
This spatialized political-economic differentiation of
life is every bit as dynamic and invasive as some of the
new medical technologies more frequently discussed
in the literature, and is of far more direct concern
to far more people around the globe. The words “in-
vasive” and “technology” have relevance here in the
broadest possible sense. Consider the “innovation” in
various forms of state violence, from incarceration, to
murder, to torture associated with the War on Terror.
Any discussion of vital politics surely should consider
how states intervene in the management of life outside
their own borders. In the War on Terror, for example,
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the deployment of certain vital discourses allows some
people in certain places to be conceptualized as hav-
ing lives that simply do not count (Gregory and Pred
2006; Klein 2007). So, too, within the territorial unit
of Gaza, the occupying Israeli forces deny the Pales-
tinian residents access to health care, water, food, and
employment (Amnesty International et al. 2008). This
is a brutal reduction of human life to bare existence as
a form of collective punishment for attacks on Israel
by some residents of Gaza. Something similar happens
in Guanta´namo, where deterrence trumps intelligence,
and the exemplary punishment of some persons outside
the law becomes a spectacular abridging of vital capac-
ity as an expression of a power that aims to terrorize
(Foot 2006). This is the power of the torturer to un-
make personality to remake a world (Scarry 1985) and
medicine is not immune from cooptation (Bloche and
Marks 2005). None of these matters really depends on
new cientific conceptions stemming from a molecular
or submolecular vision of life but they should be taken
into account when considering the remaking of human
life. One of the most illuminating ways of doing so is to
consider how vital discourses and vital orders both get
taken up in the management of spatial relations.
Vital Spaces
We have sketched something of the relationship be-
tween vital discourse and geographical discourse and
offered some critical reflections on how such discourses
flow into the formation and organization of vital or-
ders. In turn, these hierarchies of presumed worthiness
translate into distinct geographies of human flourish-
ing. There are identifiable urban geographies of poverty,
violence, and abandonment that produce disease and
mortality inequalities, as Draus (2004) shows bril-
liantly for tuberculosis in Chicago and New York and
Klinenberg (2002) shows for the Chicago heat wave of
1995. Legal and illegal pharmaceuticals are a singularly
important dimension of this spatial shaping of vital op-
portunity and disadvantage. This process operates as an
aspect both of economic opportunity and of individual
subjectivation.
The agglomeration of the pharmaceutical industry
and the privatization of health care across countries is,
as Rose rightly points out, fostering a new bioeconomy
with dimensions that are not fully encapsulated by no-
tions of biovalue or by the new forms of material wealth
being created and struggled over. There are other ways
in which we might consider the bioeconomy, however.
In terms of nonlegal pharmaceutical markets, for exam-
ple, we might want to consider how the geographical
inequalities in New York and the spatial division of the
police force under a neoliberalized administration had a
lot to do with the location and subsequent management
of that city’s crack houses. The district of Bushwick, as
a case in point, was located at the border of two police
districts, both of which left it to the other to police.
This result, along with the process of white flight and
rent busting that had led many of the properties to
be uninhabited, allowed a local drug market to thrive
(Friedman et al. 1999). Wallace and Wallace (1998)
describe a sort of ecology of neglect within Manhat-
tan that anticipated regeneration in the medium term
but that in the short term produced abandoned and
fire-damaged houses that served as shooting galleries
for people from many different parts of New York City
and its suburbs. Such ecologies incubate urban HIV
epidemics by shaping needle-sharing opportunities and
necessities; the sorts of political economies described
earlier then exacerbate them.
These geographies (of economic opportunity for
some and the state’s neglect of others) have implications
for both producers and consumers of pharmaceuticals,
both legal and illicit. Within pharmaceutical markets,
access to drugs may be determined by geographical re-
sources, say, even as attempts by companies to deal
with the fragmented nature of pharmaceutical markets
themselves can mean changes in the moral economy of
drug production. Some depression drugs are repackaged
as anti-anxiety drugs, for instance, owing to the greater
market size of the latter (Petryna and Kleinman 2006).
So, too, within the drug trade, international circuits of
cocaine are shaped by the local geographies of inequal-
ity in both New York and Colombia that are essential
to its operation.
New subjectivities are also being formed in rela-
tion to these geographical processes but these are eco-
nomic subjectivities as much as political ones. Novas
and Rose (2000) identify emergent forms of “biological
citizenship” centered on particular biosocial affinities
or solidarities and taking the form of various patient
action groups and other therapeutic communities. This
is novel and interesting but again there are other ways
that subjecthood is biologized by the state that actu-
ally compromise human capacities. Biehl, for example,
proposes that in Brazil under the pressure of neolib-
eral discourses and policies, the idea of “society” has
come to represent that group of efficient persons who
can be regulated in the cause of economic productiv-
ity; the merely “social,” on the other hand, denotes a
residuum that a policy of triage discards to a form of
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“social dying” (Biehl 2005, 52). In the service of this
politics of triage, troublesome and unproductive fam-
ily members can be managed as hopeless cases within
the family through drugs to achieve “psychopharmical
compliance” (Biehl 2005, 22). Later, the person may
be consigned to a hospital where overmedication de-
personalizes him or her until he or she is sent finally
to a hospice, or site of “social abandonment.” Although
language and desire continue for these people, they now
lack the “human-ness” (Biehl 2005, 317) that produces
rights. In effect, under neoliberal dispensation, they al-
most lost that human-ness as soon as they became not
only poor but unproductive, too. This is a regulation
of life that, producing subjectivities through economic
discipline, legitimizes a conflation of “worth exploiting”
with “worth letting live.”
Of course, the scale at which these affinities may
be drawn is an integral part of this sort of biological
citizenship. Lawrence Cohen considers the take-up of
the family planning operation by Chennai’s urban poor.
As Cohen describes, the high number of family plan-
ning operations undergone by poor women in Chennai
is partly explicable in terms of an imperial division
between reasoned elites and passionate masses within
which nexus the operation becomes a way “to make
one’s mindful body in accordance with the demands of
developmental modernity, to remake one as if one were
modern” (L. Cohen 2005, 87). But how do we evalu-
ate this sort of vital knowledge (of surgical procedures)
alongside the vital knowledge, say, of the sorts of demo-
graphic statistics that have long relocated individuals
with respect to the state? How does our account of vital
politics change when we consider not only the techno-
logically mediated biopolitics of Cohen’s account but
also the statistically mediated fertility regime in China
(Greenhalgh 2003)? TheChinese reading ofMarx’s cri-
tique of Malthus produced the idea of planned births to
replace the anarchy of capitalist human reproduction,
yet had the unanticipated consequence that many par-
ents simply hid “illegal” births, producing, as an undocu-
mented residuum, a significant population of unplanned
persons beyond the state services central to Chinese cit-
izenship. This unexamined, and yet highly significant,
apartheid may have wider consequences even than the
sorts of behavioral changes that scholars describe when
they treat fertility regimes as processes of subjectivation.
If geographies of scale constitute one axis along
which vital spaces past and present have been con-
structed, geographical variability between places con-
stitutes another. A growing fear among medical experts
today, for example, is the tendency toward self-diagnosis
that has been encouraged by the ready availability of
once hard-to-obtain medicines on the Internet. Di-
agnoses and the world they diagnose develop in con-
cert with one another (Hacking 1998) and markets for
pharmaceuticals develop in response to variously scaled
disease niches, often exacerbating inequalities in the
global burden of disease, alleviating the burden for some
and entrenching it for others. What these emergent
pharmaco-politics have in common, however, is that
they all work through existing forms of geographical in-
equality: cutting along lines of race, gender, and class.
Not only is inequality linked to the vast differences in
drug prices between different places but through forms
of patient action in response (again, here we might
think of the Treatment Action Campaign in South
Africa [Mbali, n.d.] or the Gay Men’s Health Crisis in
New York [C. Patton 2002]) and responses in turn by
the pharmaceutical companies themselves, new arenas
of contestation are opening up centered on the veryma-
trices of power through which drugs are connected with
bodies within existing political economies. As much as
some actors seek to standardize mechanisms of distribu-
tion and supply, others (or sometimes the same actors
in different places) survive by virtue of destandardiza-
tion (from peasants buying drugs from street vendors, to
the Brazilian state threatening to violate international
patent laws to reduce the price of imported antiretrovi-
rals). These differences are crucial to the sort of politics
that are emerging.
We are not saying that new developments in bio-
logical science have no implications for how we think
about human and other forms of life, nor are we saying
that these new scientific practices will not have signif-
icant geographical dimensions that might be analyzed.
We are merely saying that before we focus on novelty
alone, we should pay systematic attention to the broader
set of questions about life’s limits and capacities men-
tioned earlier and that to do so entails considering how
whatmay well be an emergent set of vital political issues
is nonetheless articulated with certain longer standing
geographies of life that already structure life chances in
very unequal ways (A. Robertson 1998; Marmot 2005).
To consider in more detail the nature and importance
of such geographies, we now focus on one of the pri-
mary dimensions of “vital” inequality: the geography of
longevity, or what we call geographical luck.
Geographical Luck
As we have already outlined, by virtue of social
position and the variable distribution of risks and
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resources, people living in different places face highly
different levels of public health security, nutrition, and
pathogenic challenge. Length of life, in other words,
is largely a matter of geographical luck. Given current
rates of age-specific mortality, a baby born in Western
Europe can expect to live past its mid-seventies, even
into its eighties if it is a girl (Kinsella and Gist 1998, 3);
however, born in India, the baby could not expect to
see its mid-sixties, in South Africa its mid-fifties, and in
Uganda its mid-forties. In India, lives are only as long
now as those allowed by the mortality rates prevailing
in Western Europe in the 1950s, South Africa is equiv-
alent to Western Europe in the 1920s, and people in
Uganda are living no longer than Western Europeans
during the Industrial Revolution. These differences
have something to do with wealth, as shown in Figure 1
(based on UNDP 2005, 219–22, 250–53). No country
with a gross domestic product (GDP) per capita above
$20,000 has an average expectation of life at birth (e0)
below seventy-seven years but this span of life is also
achieved by Chile ($10,274; e0 77.9) and Costa Rica
($9,606; e0 78.1) on aggregate average levels of wealth
only half this amount and by Cuba on substantially
less. There are twenty-six countries with wealth lying
between $10,000 and $20,000 and almost all have
life expectancies of about seventy or more, except
South Africa ($10,346; e0 49.0) and Equatorial Guinea
($19,780; e0 43.5), reflecting, in part, the combined
effects of AIDS and of unequal income distribution.
Sub-Saharan Africa contains all twenty-seven of the
countries where with current rates of mortality the
average baby could not expect even fifty years of life.
There are, of course, complex and reciprocal rela-
tions between wealth and health (Sen 1998) that lie
behind these broad national variations but the impact
of the levels of mortality found in sub-Saharan Africa
on the capacity of the population to provide for it-
self is rather basic. If adults die so young, they will be
Figure 1. The relation between life expectancy and wealth. OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; CIS =
Commonwealth of Independent States; GDP = gross domestic product.
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unlikely to repay the investment embodied in their rear-
ing and education. Some economic historians believe
the relations among mortality, dependency ratios, and
economic efficiency explain long-term patterns of eco-
nomic development (E. L. Jones 1981). For still others,
the primary controls are environmental and these deter-
mine first mortality and thus economic success (Gallup,
Sachs, and Mellinger 1999). Yet, these relations are
rather more dynamic and the sorts of static correlations
between environment and society made within these
most basic of vital discourses are of little help here.
There are nineteen countries where life expectancy has
declined over the past thirty years (see Figure 2). Three
of these (Belarus, Ukraine, and the Russian Federation)
arose from the break-up of the Soviet Union and the
others are all in sub-Saharan Africa. In these two re-
gions, states are increasingly unable to give their citizens
the sorts of physical and biological security normally ex-
pected elsewhere. The life expectancy in Botswana, at
thirty-four, is some thirty-one years below the level the
same country had reached by 1988.
Of course, these sorts of inequalities exist within
countries as well as between them. Professional and
managerial classes currently make up about 40 percent
of the population of England and Wales and unskilled
and partly skilled manual workers make up about 25
percent. The gap in life expectancy between these two
groups is four years, with the professional and manage-
rial classes having a life expectancy of eighty-two years
(Office for National Statistics [ONS] 2006b). This is
somewhat less than the equivalent geographical gap in
longevity. There are some 8,197 wards in England and
Wales that are sufficiently populous to compute a sep-
arate expectation of life at birth for the period from
1999 to 2003 (ONS 2006a). The 40 percent of the pop-
ulation living in the healthiest wards has an average
Figure 2. Acomparison of life expectancy; 1970–1975 and 2000–2005. OECD=Organisation for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment;
CIS = Commonwealth of Independent States.
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expectation of life of 80.9 years, and the 25 percent in
the least healthy have only 75.1 years. Place certainly
matters and a study of vital geographies should start
with this question of what limits capacities.
These relations among health, equality, and geogra-
phy may be causal and direct. R. G. Wilkinson (1996)
has shown that for richer countries (an annual gross
national product above $5,000 per capita), it is in-
come inequality rather than average levels of income
that is better correlated with life expectancy. Simi-
larly, Barnett and Whiteside (2002) propose that un-
equal societies lack the solidarity needed for effective
health care. Wilkinson suggests that egalitarian soci-
eties, such as Cuba, put greater social capital into sus-
taining the well-being of their members and, although
some have suggested that this reflects no more than
diminishing health returns from greater wealth, it is
still an argument in favor of more equality. Even us-
ing a weighted sum of class-specific mortalities does not
alone explain the differences between states within the
United States where there appears to be an additional
mortality penalty from living in less egalitarian areas
(Wolfson et al. 1999), even for the relatively affluent
(Subramanian and Kawachi 2006). It is very difficult
to measure the social capital that might account for
these differences but some work, again at the level of
differences between states within theUnited States, has
demonstrated a strong correlation between income in-
equality and the degree to which people evince trust in
others and, moreover, that when the effect of inequality
on trust was accounted for, there was little further sta-
tistical variation in mortality explained by the residual
pattern of inequality (Kawachi et al. 1997).
Health, wealth, and inequality are interrelated in
complex ways, but the global disparities in longevity are
so acute that they raise important questions about the
nature of our global community, of common humanity.
Does the fact that people in, say, Canada, can expect
to live for twice the period that people in Botswana can
expect place any obligations on the people in Canada?
Should the fortunate care for the less fortunate? Have
the fortunate any right to their privilege? We turn now
to an examination of how and why vital geographies
might take up some of these basic observed patterns
regarding vital limits and capacities by placing them
squarely within a consideration of geographical justice.
Geographical Justice
The health and mortality advantages some people
possess over others are largely unearned. No individual
can be said to own them because they are a collective
achievement (Kearns 2006). In this way the geograph-
ical luck of longevity raises questions of justice, at least
on Rawls’s (1971) presentation of justice as fairness.
Insofar as we recognize ourselves as part of a global
community of humans, that is, insofar as we acknowl-
edge the claims of “distant strangers” (Corbridge 1993),
we might adapt Rawls’s veil of ignorance criterion for
the original position so that it refers to geographical
rather than social positioning. We might suggest that
a fair world, one based on social justice, would be one
in which a rational person could afford to be relatively
indifferent with regard to his or her place of birth. Such
a world would adopt at the global level the principles
of justice that Rawls describes. In other words, in the
first place, all individuals would have as much freedom
as still allows a system of liberty for all other people.
In the second place, social and economic inequalities
would only be tolerated if they operated to the net ben-
efit of the most disadvantaged members of our world
society and if all positions of advantage were equally
accessible to people from all locations.
How, then, does the question of the geographical
luck of good health and long life look on this reading
of justice? Rawls argued that there were certain ad-
vantages of birth that were not deserved and that the
individual did not, therefore, hold as a property to ex-
ploit at will. Fair equality of opportunity might require
affirmative action where practicable, and justice might
require compensation where affirmative action was not
practicable. Extending Rawls’s arguments to the field
of health, Daniels (1985) suggested that individuals in
a fair society had a right to good health, or “normal
species functioning.” This falls short of the claim of the
WHO (2005, 1) constitution of 1946 that health is “a
state of complete physical, mental and social well be-
ing and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.”
Although many find this a helpful and expansive un-
derstanding of health (Fleuret and Atkinson 2007), we
are persuaded more by Daniels, who proposed that this
definition of health implies too open-ended a commit-
ment to be helpful as a basis for rights, however useful it
might be for other descriptive purposes. In similar fash-
ion, Saracci (1997) suggested that to equate health with
happiness is at best vague and, we might add, offers a
dangerous prospect of virtually every aspect of our lives
being medicalized to the benefit of the pharmaceutical
industry (Moynihan, Heath, and Henry 2002), in ways
that might actually reduce autonomy and free choice.
Ill health prejudices social inclusion. Social exclu-
sion is also implicated in stress-related conditions (Noh
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [M
ay
no
oth
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
8:3
6 2
2 A
ug
us
t 2
01
7 
Vital Geographies: Life, Luck, and the Human Condition 565
et al. 1999) such as drug dependency, hypertension, and
mental health problems, including those that provoke
suicide (Social Exclusion Unit [SEU] 1999). There is
a vicious circle here and research in vital geographies
might contribute to debates over primary causes and
secondary effects as, for example, in Britain, where the
official policy on social exclusion treats children absent-
ing themselves from school as the cause of alienation
that, in turn, produces effects through lack of access to
jobs and a failure to respect the rights of others (SEU
1999). Truancy is so heavily correlated with poverty
and difficult home circumstances, however, that many
dimensions of exclusion precede the child’s failure at
school (Colley and Hodkinson 2001). To suggest medi-
cal solutions for such problems is to tackle the symptom
and not the cause, and the connections between New
Labour’s tendency to select for reconditioning the indi-
viduals who are deemed to be deviant to its economic
reliance on the furtherance of the pharmaceutical sector
(the United Kingdom’s one industrial arm that actually
contributes new research and development) are to be
watched with concern. Rather than evaluate the social
uptake of this medicalization of social problems, a vital
geography perspective might argue that the geograph-
ical inequalities noted earlier for Britain suggest social
and environmental causes that raise questions about
poverty and whether it is acceptable for life chances to
be so heavily determined by class and postal code. At
the global level, we are already seeing the consequences
of the medicalization of social problems in the “global
sanitary apartheid” described by Nguyen and Peschard
(2003, 464). To respond to these variously scaled geo-
graphical problematizations of “life itself” (that is, life
understood in its biological and social interconnected-
ness), we now want to consider some of the ways we
might relate vital geographies to geographical justice.
In place of static accounts of the geographical determi-
nants of the limits and capacities of human life (e.g.,
Sachs 2005), we look instead at the interconnectedness
of human lives along six dimensions: culpability, fair-
ness, the ethics of care, state failure, human rights, and
solidarity.
Toward a Vital Geography
Putting Privilege and Suffering on the Same Map
Sontag (2003, 102–03) encourages us to reflect “on
how our privileges are located on the same map as their
suffering” (emphasis added). To do so raises the ques-
tion of the culpability of the fortunate. There are clearly
ways that people living in rich countries benefit from
the conditions that make people elsewhere poor and
unhealthy. Unfair terms of trade and the use of tariffs
and subsidies to help domestic producers in rich coun-
tries mean that producers in poor countries receive less
than a living wage for products that rich people buy
without second thought. The cost of living for the rich
and the standard of living for the poor are kept down in
concert with one another (Stiglitz and Charlton 2005).
The rich are also culpable in the vital fate of the poor
through their pursuit of debt repayment, which leaves
poor states with even less capacity to deal with the
health consequences of poverty (Schoepf, Schoepf, and
Millen 2000) and through insisting on rent for intellec-
tual property rights that prevent people in poor coun-
triesmaking or buying themedicines they need (‘tHoen
2002). These structural inequalities persist despite the
burden of ill health in poor countries, basically, because
moremoney can bemade from treating the sicknesses of
rich people. Between 1975 and 1997 only about 1 per-
cent of newly approved drugs were distinctly for tropical
diseases (Trouiller and Olliaro 1999). On the basis of
the justice arguments we made earlier, because people
in rich countries benefit from these asymmetries, they
owe people in poor countries redress at the very least,
and that means paying heed to inequalities of longevity
and how some of these symptoms of an exploitative
economic system might be alleviated. The first work of
vital geographies, then, is to document inequalities and
explain why they arise.
A Fair World
Alongside our culpability as beneficiaries of “struc-
tural violence” (Farmer 2004), we might reflect more
explicitly on the “fairness” of geographical luck and
what that might imply for how we acknowledge obli-
gations. Although it is not the way Rawls developed
his justice-as-fairness argument, we think there is merit
in considering the moral claims of a global community.
Baker (1987) argues that gross inequality depraves in-
terpersonal relations, allowing rich people to make de-
mands of poor people that they would themselves find
degrading. It is clear, for example, that international
networks of child adoption rest, in large part, on ex-
ploiting the poverty of some families, inducing them to
surrender for adoption children who they cannot nur-
ture themselves (Hollingsworth 2003). Singer (1999)
proposes that fairness suggests we can defend little of our
gratuitous spending while other people must go with-
out even basic needs. If we made such charitable gifts,
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we would be securing a moral good “without sacrific-
ing anything of comparable moral importance” (Singer
1972, 231). This moral imperative, for Singer, is inde-
pendent of distance or familiarity, as long as one has
a reasonable idea of what is needed in distant places.
Vital geographies, by documenting need, by focusing
on “the impediments to survival” (Heynen 2006, 920),
can cultivate the empathy that leads people to accept
these sorts of obligations.
Caring for Others
Health care is a form of repair, and caring stems from
an impulse to make good (Spelman 2002). In this re-
gard, empirical work in vital geography might cultivate
an ethic of care by nurturing this impulse (D. M. Smith
2000, ch. 5; Popke 2006). Gilligan (1977) argues that
alongside the morality of justice, there is a morality
based on care. Such moral claims come from a sense
of responsibility embedded in particular relationships.
They are less abstract than the claims of justice. Tronto
(1987) elaborated these insights in suggestive ways by
proposing that the status of care is low because it does
not derive its claims from universal principles of justice
but instead from sentiments arising from affective ties.
In this respect, whereas justice is claimed by the domi-
nant social group, care is left as the activity of the sub-
ordinate group, be it female or, she speculates, black.
Tronto (1987, 658) argues that care, as a contextual
morality, needs to specify “ways in which individuals
progress morally to exhibit concern for others.” At the
very least, care requires familiarity and thus empathy.
Knowing about and imagining the lives of others helps
us feel a common humanity (Kirmayer 2003). Such a
feeling might be partly what is at work within the sorts
of new medical communities Novas and Rose (2000)
describe, but it should also be at work within our analy-
ses of the geographical inequalities of life chances such
communities take as their raison d’eˆtre. Certainly, no-
tions of social caring need to be considered alongside
notions of medical or therapeutic care. Gilligan (1983,
44) herself proposed that such an extension of amorality
of care depends on “the capacity to assume responsibil-
ity for care.”
Here again, vital geographies might draw on the no-
tion of geographical luck to advance both imperatives
of empathy and capacity. People can cultivate a feeling
of having a duty of care toward others by understanding
how they do, indeed, already have many relations with
distant strangers in commodity chains, through asym-
metric travel and migration laws, and through inter-
country debt and trade relations that sustain our lives
as they curtail theirs, rather than leaving mutual ac-
tion to the realm of shared biosocial affinities. This
seems particularly important, given that, in the area
of public health, the cost of effective interventions is
relatively modest and thus, in this respect at least, the
geographical luck of longevity does indeed invite a duty
of care that is eminently dischargeable. The United
Nations Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and
Malaria, for example, began work in 2003 and in its
first three years it had disbursed grants of $3.24 bil-
lion (Global Fund 2007). By December 2006, it had
770,000 people on antiretroviral treatment for HIV and
2 million people on directly observed treatment, short
course (DOTS) for curing tuberculosis. Some 18 mil-
lion insecticide-treated bed nets had been distributed to
protect families from malaria. Some of these interven-
tions are very cheap. The DOTS cure for tuberculosis
costs only $10 per person and a treated mosquito net is
only $4. How do we create rights for such things? Before
answering this question, we consider briefly the geogra-
phy of state capacities (and incapacities) for regulating
life because, as often as not, it is such geographies that
stand in the way of realizing medical disbursements.
Compromised Sovereignty
The fourth dimension of geographical luck that we
wish to consider is the question of state failure and the
obligations that might follow. A range of justifications
has been offered for “humanitarian interventions,” of
various kinds. M. J. Smith (1998, 76) follows many,
including recent UN policy, when he argues that “a
state that is oppressive and violates the autonomy and
integrity of its subjects forfeits its moral claim to full
sovereignty.”We are here in the terrain sketched out by
Rawls (1993) in his law of peoples. There is a worrying
slippage possible, from pleas for intervention to avert
genocide, to interventions in support of more general
political freedoms. We do not share the enthusiasm of
Boot (2003), Cooper (2003), and Kurtz (2003) for the
latter, struck as we are by the danger of new intensified
international inequalities being created under the cover
of building democracy (Hindess 2001; Rhodes 2003;
Rieff 2005) and by the lack of guarantees that the polit-
ical rights promoted actually result in rights to health.
Nevertheless, it is possible to imagine circumstances
in which a people are so badly ruled that health care
is denied them by their government. In such a sit-
uation, a foreign coalition of the willing might well
feel justified in offering to provide and distribute the
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prophylaxis themselves. This at least is the justification
for doctors crossing borders, Me´dicins Sans Frontie`res
(MSF).Whereas the Red Cross and Red Crescent oper-
ate only with the consent of states, MSF was willing to
act for people lacking a government concerned enough
to accept assistance for them (Kouchner 1991). In some
respects, though, and against the example of armed hu-
manitarian interference in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and
Iraq,MSFhas becomemore and not less wary of crossing
borders without permission (Redfield 2006). More’s the
pity: There is a return flow from medical intervention-
ism to state building. As theGlobal Fund (2007) argues,
developing medical services within poor countries not
only trains individuals but advances civil society and
state capacities (Walton, Farmer, and Lambert 2004).
To return to our earlier argument, there is a sense in
Rose that the pastoral state is no more. What we are
suggesting here is that the pastoral state has always been
a partial state. Some human rights to good health can
be acknowledged at the level of the system of states, and
when care crosses borders it might even contribute to
developing pastoral practices and expectations of care
within states.
Global Human Rights
This discussion of the ethics of crossing borders raises
further questions about ethnocentrism,Western norms,
and the question of an acceptable basis for interference
in the public health of other states. Reclus (1908, 528)
wrote that “[t]he conquest of bread . . . does not consist
only in eating, but in eating bread that is one’s human
right.”2 In other words, mere abundance, the availabil-
ity of food, would not end hunger. Similarly, health
is not guaranteed by medicine or technology but only
where people have a right to lives not unnecessarily
damaged by toxins, exhaustion, and dangerous work-
places, and where, when they do fall ill, they have fair
access to health care and to the medicines that should
be considered the collective property of humankind.
In his Nobel Prize speech on behalf of MSF, Orbinski
proposed that “[b]ringing medical aid to people in dis-
tress is an attempt to defend them against what is ag-
gressive to them as human beings” and, furthermore,
that this action aims to “enable individuals to regain
their rights and dignity as human beings” (MSF 1999).
The dominant principles of human rights are set out in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, based on
removing obstacles to human autonomy and dignity.
Article 25 mentions specifically a standard of living
adequate for “health and well-being,” which includes
“medical care.” In the name of this principle people
raise justice claims in consequence of the geographical
luck of longevity. Indeed, these issues are at the heart of
Sen’s (1999) presentation of development as freedom.
Social and economic rights, he suggests, are essential
to the dignity and autonomy we call freedom, or as we
put it earlier, the capacity of exercising our free will,
of truly living. To say, however, that from a sense of
justice, fairness, or caring, we conceive an obligation
to address the suffering of others is to assert that we
know how to do so and thus raises three sets of con-
cerns about acting on such an international obligation:
effectiveness, justification, and commitment.
Tronto (1993) writes of care as a practical rationality
that rests on four ethical elements: the attentiveness of
noticing need in others, the responsibility of accepting
an obligation to help, the competence of knowing what
is needed, and the responsiveness of finding out how
effectively care is received. Some argue that percep-
tions of incompetence are often merely the projection
onto others of our own local norms: They must need
what we think we need. The problem of effectiveness
(that is, of competence and responsiveness) is well illus-
trated by medical humanitarianism. Medical assistance
to refugees, for example, can become a way simply of
maintaining them as bare life and refiguring interna-
tional concern as about nothing more. Refugee life is
politically disqualified in Agamben’s (1998) terms. For
example, Turner (2005) describes a camp for refugees
from Burundi living in Tanzania. There, any such pol-
itics as exist in the camp can take place only around
the basic provisioning for everyday life because the
Tanzanian state does not want to be drawn into con-
flict with its neighbor. This in turn raises the question
of how to address the root causes of suffering, a ques-
tion addressed within MSF for one through the politics
of bearing witness; making the plight of the suffering
people known outside their country, to act as inter-
national advocates calling attention to the betrayal of
global human rights (Redfield 2006).
Some do not see the justification for this sort of global
human rights culture. Butt (2002a), for example, has
suggested that the very injustices that are at the heart
of structural violence likewise deform global morality,
while the notions of equality articulated in such aca-
demic and advocacy writings are of a piece with the
very forces of liberalism that incorporate the poor into
unequal international relations. InWest Papua, suggests
Butt (2002b, 32), many reject MSF initiatives, which
they see as “replicat[ing] existing forms of class and eth-
nic bias between indigenous Papuans and Indonesians.”
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This is largely an ad hominem critique, however, al-
though at another level, it is a variant on the arguments
against cosmopolitanism and in favor of difference and
local autonomy. Cheah (1997) has explained very lu-
cidly how a sort of culturalist cosmopolitanism elides
material determinations of disadvantage and sidelines
one of the few movements addressing neocolonialism,
nationalism. Yet, medicine is not only a social knowl-
edge, it is also material and it can be effective (Das
2006). Disease feeds stigma and exclusion (Briggs 2005)
in ways that good health might address. There are, in
any case, few truly local medical discourses anymore
and all are a product of a historical geography of in-
terconnectedness so that we might view difference in
this field as “temporary localisation” (Apadurai 1988).
If we conceive that people have a right to healthy life
closer to the global “golden mean,” as Aristotle put it,
then we are justified in caring, so long as we pay atten-
tion to the ethical principles of care. Competence and
responsiveness are part of that justification.
Western biomedical products are already part ofmed-
ical systems in many parts of the world and they are
not always used well, either in rich or in poor places.
If we believe that certain medicines will work to re-
store health to people, then we can explain this belief
to them and give them the opportunity to receive the
medicines. Commodified medicine may well turn iatro-
genic but that is less likely with pro bono clinics as long
as their science is put at the service of social justice. In-
deed,MSFhas set up its own research facility, Epicentre,
precisely to do so. Likewise, the Global Fund is train-
ing medical staff in the places in which it works. Local
people are recruited to preventive programs from which
they have themselves already benefited. There are dan-
gers that commercial medicine can distort these rela-
tions in pursuit of profit but both MSF and the Global
Fund are campaigning very actively around questions
of pharmaceutical pricing and patents. The queues out-
side free clinics suggest that many poor people will seek
the benefit of this medicine. In many cases, they also
come to articulate a sense that all people should get the
medical care they need. Medical charity can build local
institutions and local civil society.
Perhaps a more pertinent critique is that of commit-
ment: that people can become dependent on medicines
that are then retractedwhen the charity drip they are on
runs dry, or the organization is compelled for reasons of
its own security (and on the basis of the value it attaches
to the lives of its “own” people) to pull out. The funds
that nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) compete
for are often “sporadic and short term,” despite “the
universal recognition that NGOs and their activities
are required for many years” (Frangonikolopoulos 2005,
58). Such interruptions can be very dangerous, for ex-
ample, to the health of people placed on antiretroviral
therapies to control their HIV disease (Li et al. 2005).
The criticisms of humanitarianism are sometimes
overplayed but there is plenty of evidence that the
more pertinent of the critics are being listened to and
that there is indeed more practical criticism now being
expressed within rather than outside these organiza-
tions. Vital geographies should study the practice of
care within humanitarian agencies to develop some an-
swers to the common criticisms of global rights-based
culture as insensitive and intrusive. At the same time,
this should square off against the different sorts of argu-
ments put forward by Rorty: that solidarity (equal care
with respect to those we are unequally connected to)
is untenable and one is best served by working on the
contingent factors that dictate why we care more for
some than for others: “that we try to extend our sense
of ‘we’ to people whom we have previously thought of
as ‘they’” (Rorty 1989, 192). We might agree with him
in this sense at least that human solidarity is “made
rather than found” (195) to the extent that this places
the burden of action proportionately on the bearers of
its agency.
Once it is recognized that there is an international
right to health, there is an obligation to think pragmat-
ically about how it may best be conceptualized and se-
cured.We are persuaded byNussbaum’s (2006) account
of an “overlapping consensus” (300) around a series of
human capacities that must be sustained (to a minimal
level) as basic to the good life. Although these rights
are due to all and the responsibilities fall on all capable
of discharging them, we accept Nussbaum’s argument
that these rights are best secured, and the duty best dis-
charged, by supporting institutions that can address the
collective action problem at the heart of health care.
We have described how existing NGO practices con-
tribute to building institutional capacity within poorer
countries. Supporting the work of charities is one part
of this process, but more effective by far is the proper
funding of this duty through general taxation in richer
countries. Here, too, it is clear that states have an im-
portant role to play.
Global Justice Movements
We have argued that the harms that produce ill
health and shorter lives in some places are in turn
shaped by the interrelations of states and capital. Yet,
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the proposals for change that we have considered so far
address states and capital only insofar as they impact di-
rectly on health outcomes. Thus we have remarked on
how medical charities and NGOs might develop state
capacities in the ways they deliver care. We have com-
mented on the regulatory regimes and property rights
associated with medicines and medical technologies. In
other words, we have examined the political economy
of medicine and of health care even though we recog-
nize that the distribution of wealth and poverty is itself
directly shaped by a broader political economy: unfair
terms of trade, egregious debt arrangements, and the use
of military force, the threat of force, or support for mili-
tary juntas to enforce the privatization of the commons
in poorer or weaker countries. There are two reasons
for taking this direction. First, we want to focus on hu-
man vitality as the measure of injustice. It is in large
part because the broader political economy has unfair
consequences for the life chances of people in distant
places that it stands condemned. We want to place the
emphasis on life’s capacities, and thus would condemn
exploitation because it harms life, rather than because
in some zero-sum calculation some get more goods and
others get less. Issues of global governance are thus pri-
oritized in a distinctively vital way (Soskolne 2007).
Second, we want to identify what can be done in a
palliative sense to redress some of the consequences
of unfair economic situations. To the extent that such
harms can be attended to, they should be, because to do
so would be a worthy achievement in its own right. To
postpone what can be done to make lives better now,
awaiting amore general rearrangement of the global po-
litical economy, is to discount present suffering against
future benefit. Life is linear, and harm now is not easily
compensated by later ease.
There are, however, many movements that engage
directly with the broader political economy and do so in
the name of life. Hawken (2007, 2) estimates that there
are between 1 and 2 million organizations campaigning
around the interrelated issues of environmental and so-
cial justice. He summarizes their common ground quite
simply: “[l]ife is themost fundamental human right, and
all of the movements within the movement are dedi-
cated to creating the conditions for life, conditions that
include livelihood, food, security, peace, a stable envi-
ronment, and freedom from external tyranny” (Hawken
2007, 68). Vital geographies should study this move-
ment and, as with the wisdom developed within NGOs,
should seek to learn from its experiences. This overlap-
ping set of solidarities is enriching our understanding of
how rights-based arguments can be used to defend life.
From the “diversity of autonomy” (Hawken 2007, 18)
comes a series of ideas rather than the focus of a single
ideology, yet there are common features already plain.
The movement incorporates a deep respect for indige-
nous peoples as custodians of the “greatest remaining
sanctuaries of life on earth” (Hawken 2007, 7) and for
their long-term planetary rather than short-term eco-
nomic perspective on the vitality of civilization. The
grounds of the solidarities within this movement need
to be studied explicitly. Charging crimes against hu-
manity has proven to be one effective way to make
transnational solidarities effective (G. Robertson 2006)
and this approach could be extended, for example, into
the world of work around issues of slavery and child la-
bor (Kearns 2008). This perspective prioritizes the most
heinous of injuries.
Canguilhem identified a “vitalist imperative” as an
expression of “the mind’s capacity, as living conscious-
ness of life, to identify with the living as like with like”
(quoted in Philo 2007, 88). In a brilliant survey, Philo
notes that Canguilhem’s vitalism yet leaves room for
humanism, because “for all his vitalist leanings, he also
gives special credence to the suffering human being”
(Philo 2007, 89). Canguilhem reaches these conclu-
sions through an examination of the genealogy of the
notions of “normal” and “pathological,” but our argu-
ment here is that we might likewise ground such an
orientation in an examination of what exactly it is that
has enabled environmental and social justice move-
ments to organize global solidarities around issues per-
taining to life. Some such wisdom is at the heart of
this global movement of movements that extends care
to other persons, and to other living things, and it is
from that perspective that it has developed a series of
critical observations on “globalization,” seen as an as-
sault on the autonomy, integrity, and survival of indige-
nous societies in the cause of short-term gain for distant
investors.
Conclusion: Health, Geography, and Luck
At the beginning of this article we presented a
twofold definition of life, as that determined by both
its limits and its capacities. The sociology of possibil-
ity that we surveyed has tended to focus attention on
the modification and enhancement of life’s capacities,
at the expense of the also much-needed enquiry into
life’s limits. By drawing attention to the geography that
underpins vital knowledges and practices, and by eluci-
dating some of the basic power relations that underlie
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such practices (power relations shaped most fundamen-
tally, we feel, by the twin poles of states and capital),
we have sought to redress the balance somewhat. Life
as a bare quantitative good that can be measured in
years and plotted on maps presents no less intriguing
ethical, moral, and sociological questions than do pro-
cesses by which vital capacities are technologically and
culturally altered. In fact, as we hope to have shown,
the most interesting and complex questions are those
that investigate the mutually constitutive relationship
between advancement of our capacity to shape life at
one end of the spectrum and to neglect it at the other.
We have argued for the need not only for a “geograph-
ical” vision of life to counterbalance the “molecular”
vision promoted by some scholars but also for a mode
of intellectual enquiry that encompasses the two. The
rearticulation of some lives is bound up in a longer run-
ning dearticulation of others. So much of consequence
for longevity and health flows from the accident of place
of birth, and from the constrained choice of residence,
that we must recognize and reflect on the significance
of what we term geographical luck.
The effects of geographical luck can be seen per-
haps most starkly by focusing at the international level.
Acknowledging that the international is but one rele-
vant scale needing consideration, we have also sought
to delineate what such an approach might look like. In
particular, we have tried to show that a vital geograph-
ical approach needs to examine the interconnectedness
of human lives between places and across scales of ac-
tion. We set out six dimensions of interconnectedness
that raise fundamental questions of duty and care. This
approach might disappoint those who argue that noth-
ing short of the abolition of the global capitalist system
can address the fundamental causes of social problems.
Such arguments find themselves paralyzed by the im-
possibility of bringing this about within an acceptable
time scale and with acceptable social costs. Instead, an
approach that sets the explanation of inequality, the
documentation of need, and the fostering of an ethic of
care alongside an awareness of the structural difficulties
in enacting such care and the duty to discharge it ef-
fectively, should be supportive of attempts to recognize
and mitigate contextual constraints with the greatest
dispatch possible.
A vital geographical analysis thus considers techno-
logical developments and emergent possibilities for life
as elements on a wider plane of moral and political
economy. The technological mediation of life itself has
a long history and is not limited simply to developments
in biomedicine, and the pertinent aspects of that his-
tory should be brought to the fore when studying it. At
the same time, new technological capacities refashion
long-standing questions of how and why some individ-
uals are morally obliged to help others in need. Health
and geography are thus not just two words of a subdis-
cipline engaged in asking these very questions; they are
coordinates for a necessary and just ethic of care.
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Notes
1. We are grateful to one of the referees for pointing out to
us this implication of Western universality.
2. “La conqueˆte du Pain . . .ne s’agit pas simplement de
manger, mais demanger le pain duˆ a son droıˆt d’homme.”
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